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The interplay between risk aversion and incentives is central to the moral haz-
ard literature, especially in designing an optimal contract. In this literature, one
of the very few general results, as Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) argue, is the
informativeness principle. This theory, going back to Holmstrom et al. (1979),
Holmstrom (1982), and Grossman and Hart (1983), states that a wage contract
should contain only informative signals about the agent’s effort. Despite the well-
established paradigm, many labor contracts are stochastic in that they include
noise that does not provide any statistical information about the agent’s effort.1
This gap between theory and observed contracts suggests that a traditional ap-
proach focusing solely on risk aversion might give a partial and incomplete picture
of the moral hazard problem.
Although loss aversion is a fundamental concept in behavior economics and
is well-established with ample experimental and field evidence, the interplay be-
tween loss aversion and incentives remains understudied in the moral hazard
literature. More recently, Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin (2004) argue that
loss aversion drives much of human behavior. “In a wide variety of domains”, as
Rabin (2004) puts forward, “people are significantly more averse to losses than
they are attracted to same-sized gains”. One prominent realm in which loss aver-
sion plays an significant role is the domain of money and wealth (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991). It is thus important to incorporate loss aversion in the analysis
of the optimal wage contract, and to better understand how loss aversion affects
the tradeoff between insurance and incentives in the moral hazard model.
This paper analyzes the optimal wage contract in the setting of moral haz-
ard and loss aversion, in which the agent is expectation-based loss averse and
the principal can use stochastic contracts. The main result is that stochastic
contracts reduce the principal’s implementation cost in comparison with deter-
ministic contracts that implement the same action. When performance signals
are highly informative about the agent’s effort, the dominance of stochastic con-
tracts over deterministic contracts holds for almost any degree of loss aversion.
Furthermore, I find that limited liability ensures the existence of the optimal con-
funding through the International Doctoral Program “Evidence-Based Economics” of the Elite Network
of Bavaria.
1In workplaces, firms successfully adopt teams and team incentives (Che and Yoo, 2001; Lazear and
Shaw, 2007; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2013) in which a team’s performance depends not only on
an employee’s effort but also the effort exerted by other team members. In addition, non-executive
employees increasingly receive payments in stock options (Core and Guay, 2001; Bergman and Jenter,
2007; Hochberg and Lindsey, 2010; Kim and Ouimet, 2014) whose valuation is influenced by external
shocks in the financial sector.
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tract, and that the optimal stochastic contract pays a high wage with certainty
when a good signal is realized and with a positive probability when a bad signal
is realized. Lastly, I show a condition under which stochastic contracts mitigate
the inefficiencies arising from risk and loss aversion.
More specifically, I extend the simple principal-agent model under moral hazard,
in which both the agent’s actions and observable signals are binary, by making
two assumptions. The first assumption is that the agent is expectation-based
loss averse as defined in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). In particular, the
agent forms a reference point after taking an action, and thus his chosen action
affects his reference point. The agent compares his realized wage to the stochastic
reference point, and he feels a loss if the actual wage is smaller than the reference
wage. The second assumption is that the principal can add noise to performance
signals by employing stochastic contracts. In particular, the principal can add a
lottery after observing the realized signal. Stochastic contracts thus serve as a
tool for the principal to manipulate the signal distribution. A crucial feature of
my model is that the principal can fully control the structure of the stochastic
contract, i.e., the odds of the lottery.
I find that there exists a stochastic contract that strictly dominates determin-
istic contracts. Under the stochastic contract, the principal pays out a high wage
whenever she observes a good signal, while upon observing a bad signal she adds a
lottery that gives either the high wage or a low wage that serves as a harsh penalty
to the agent for the bad signal. The advantages of this stochastic contract under
loss aversion are twofold. First, the stochastic contract with this turning-a-blind-
eye structure remedies an implementation problem associated with loss aversion.
In deterministic contracts, this implementation problem is well-established, i.e.,
the agent may choose the stochastically dominated action when he is sufficiently
loss averse (Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk, 2010). As a result, the principal
may be unable to induce the agent to exert effort. In sharp contrast, by employ-
ing the stochastic contract, the principal can always implement the desired action
for any degree of loss aversion.
Second, even if deterministic contracts do not face the implementation problem,
the stochastic contract helps the principal lower the cost of implementing the
desired action beyond what is achieved under the optimal deterministic contract.
Note that the stochastic contract, as compared to deterministic contracts, has
two countering effects on the principal’s cost. On the one hand, the stochastic
4 MARCH 2021
contract might increase the principal’s cost, because the high wage is now paid
out more often and a larger wage spread is required to incentivize the agent to
work. On the other hand, the stochastic contract reduces the probability that
the agent feels a loss, thus the principal might capitalize on this reduction in
the agent’s loss premium to achieve a lower cost. When the positive effect of
reducing the loss premium outweighs the negative effect of increasing the expected
bonus, the stochastic contract dominates deterministic contracts. Whether the
stochastic contract is dominant depends on the agent’s degree of loss aversion and
the informativeness of performance signals.
Interestingly, as performance signals get more informative about the agent’s ac-
tion, the principal favors the stochastic contract under a wider range of the degree
of loss aversion. When performance signals are highly uninformative, the princi-
pal is better off with the stochastic contract under a most restrictive condition,
i.e., only when the agent feels losses at least twice as strongly as same-sized gains.
This condition gets weaker if performance signals provide some information about
the agent’s action. When performance signals convey almost perfect information,
the stochastic contract dominates deterministic contracts for almost any degree
of loss aversion. Intuitively, when performance signals are highly informative, the
principal can provide further wage certainty at a negligible cost. Thus, this find-
ing has an important implication for designing contracts for loss-averse agents:
the principal has an incentive to add noise after the bad signal to insure the agent
against wage uncertainty.
Yet I show that the second-best optimal stochastic contract might not exist.
In particular, the principal’s cost strictly decreases as the probability of getting
the high wage increases. This implies that the principal prefers to push the
probability of the high wage close to one. However, the principal cannot provide
wage certainty because of the incentive constraint, and hence the solution to the
principal’s problem is not well-defined. This existence problem differs from the
above implementation problem under loss aversion in that the stochastic contract
can always implement the desired action, but if used, the optimal stochastic
contract does not exist. Given the wide range under which stochastic contracts
dominate deterministic contracts, the existence problem appears more severe than
previously thought.
In mitigating the non-existence problem, I find that limited liability helps re-
store the existence of the optimal stochastic contract. The optimal stochastic
LOSS AVERSION, MORAL HAZARD, AND STOCHASTIC CONTRACTS 5
contract pays a bonus with certainty when the good signal is realized and with a
positive probability when the bad signal is realized; otherwise, the agent receives
a lowest possible wage, at which the limited liability constraint is binding. This
finding highlights the importance of imposing limited liability in stochastic con-
tracts to restrict the extent the principal can punish the agent in the event of the
bad signal and to ensure that the second-best optimal contract exists.
Lastly, I consider the general case when the agent is both risk and loss averse,
and show that if a penalty wage (i.e., a wage level at which the agent feels a
substantial disutility) exists, the first best can be approximated closely but not
attained. The benefit of the stochastic contract crucially depends on how effec-
tively the principal can punish the agent in the event of bad signals, because the
effective punishment is necessary for inducing the agent to work. If the principal
uses the penalty wage to punish the agent, she can employ stochastic contracts to
insure the agent against wage uncertainty to a very large extent and still create a
strong marginal incentive to work. The finding that the first best can be closely
approximated but not attained resembles the result in Mirrlees (1974) seminal
work. In Mirrlees (1974), the approximation of the first best is driven by the
signal’s normal distribution which has the property that for extreme outcomes it
becomes very informative about the agent’s action. This assumption, however,
does not play any role for my result.
While for the most part of the paper, I assume that a reference point is formed
after the decision is taken, and allow for a stochastic reference point. In the
Discussion section, I relax these assumptions and discuss alternative notions of
loss aversion. In particular, the result holds under the forward-looking disap-
pointment aversion according to Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), or Gul
(1991), in which the reference point is the recent expectation but does not allow
for stochastic reference points. It also remains valid to the concept of preferred
personal equilibrium by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), which assumes that the refer-
ence point is formed before taking the decision and hence is taken as given. The
robustness of the result suggests that noise should be generally added to perfor-
mance signals in the optimal contract for loss-averse agents. When loss aversion
plays a significant role in the agent’s preferences, the principal can insure the
agent against wage uncertainty by employing stochastic contracts.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section I summarizes the related
literature. Section II outlines the model, and Section III specifies the principal’s
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problem and derives the set of feasible contracts. Section IV presents the main
results and discusses alternative notions of loss aversion. Section V concludes.
All proofs of lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
I. Related Literature
In this section, I provide an overview of the literature on behavioral contract
theory, which is most related to this paper. I also refer to the literature that
highlights the optimality of stochastic contracts and that provides explanations
for the unresponsiveness of wages to performance.
My paper is most closely related and complementary to Herweg, Müller and
Weinschenk (2010) who show that, in the setting of moral hazard and loss aver-
sion, the optimal deterministic contract is a bonus contract. Complementary to
their finding, my paper provides further insight into the characteristics of the
optimal contract under loss aversion: the probability of getting a bonus is set as
high as possible. Furthermore, while their paper proposes stochastic contracts
as a remedy to the implementation problem of deterministic contracts, my pa-
per highlights the optimality of stochastic contracts for almost any degree of loss
aversion, and even when deterministic contracts are implementable.
In the literature on behavioral contract theory, my paper also relates to Daido
and Murooka (2016) who show that the principal may employ team incentives
when the agents are loss averse. Similar to their paper, my paper stresses the
role of limited liability in ensuring the existence of the optimal contract. How-
ever, their paper focuses on team incentives and takes a team structure as given,
whereas I examine individual stochastic contracts and consider noise as one of
the principal’s variables.
My paper also relates to the extensive literature on reference-dependent pref-
erences, starting out with the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
where the agent’s utility depends on a reference point and the agents feel losses
more strongly than gains. Subsequently, as reviewed by Barberis (2013), several
papers have contributed to theoretical extensions—covering reference-dependent
models of both static (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Munro and Sugden,
2003; Sugden, 2003; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006; De Giorgi and Post, 2011) and
dynamic nature (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2009; Barberis and Huang, 2001; Barberis,
Huang and Santos, 2001)—and applications of reference-dependent preferences
into real-life problems, such as in tournaments (Gill and Stone, 2010), saving de-
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cisions (Jofre, Moroni and Repetto, 2015), asset pricing (Pagel, 2016), life-cycle
consumption (Pagel, 2017), intertemporal incentives (Macera, 2018), and port-
folio choices (Pagel, 2018). My paper contributes to the literature strand that
incorporates expectation-based reference-dependent preferences into moral haz-
ard models, as summarized by Koszegi (2014), by providing the characteristics of
the optimal stochastic contracts for loss-averse agents.
My results speak to a growing literature that highlights the optimality of noise
in the contract. Haller (1985) finds that randomization benefits the principal
when the agent faces an aspiration constraint of achieving certain income levels
with certain probabilities. Strausz (2006) shows that stochastic mechanisms may
be optimal in a screening context. Lang (2020) examines the optimal contract
with subjective evaluations, and shows that stochastic contracts may increase
the principal’s profits and eliminate the requirement of a third-party payment.
Ostrizek (2020) finds that the principal prefers to set wages contingent on a noisy
information structure, because the agent remains uninformed about their match-
specific ability and is cheaper to motivate. Contributing to this literature, I show
that noise can serve as a tool to insure the agent against wage uncertainty.
By highlighting that the principal prefers to lump signals together into a bonus
set, my findings also adds to the rich literature attempting to explain why wages
are rigid relative to performance. Considering multiple tasks that are substi-
tutes, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) shows that wages should not respond to
performance because strong incentives for an observable task worsens the agent’s
performance on the other unmeasurable task. At large, several explanation for
a fixed-wage contract have proposed, including monitoring cost (Lazear, 1986),
relative performance and cooperation (Lazear, 1989), relational contracts (e.g.,
MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Levin, 2003), and reciprocal preferences (En-
glmaier and Leider, 2012).
II. The Model
I consider a principal-agent model in a moral hazard and loss aversion setting.
The principal (she) offers an one-period employment contract to the agent (he),
which the agent either accepts or rejects. If the agent rejects, he receives his
reservation utility which is assumed to be zero.2 If the agent accepts the contract,
2Assuming the reservation utility is zero is consistent with the “quitting” constraint. This assumption
is made for the sake of simplicity of analysis. The main results would continue to hold when the reservation
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he then makes a binary action a ∈ {aH , aL}, i.e., he either “works” (a = aH) or
“shirks” (a = aL). The cost of working for the agent is c(aH) = c, for c > 0, and
the cost of shirking is normalized at zero c(aL) = 0.
The action a is private information of the agent that the principal cannot ob-
serve. Instead, the principal is assumed to observe a contractible signal for the
agent’s action. The signal s ∈ S = {1, 2} is good (s = 2) or bad (s = 1). The
agent receives the good signal with probability qH if he works and with probabil-
ity qL if he shirks, where 1 > qH > qL > 0. The signal distribution is common
knowledge.
The agent exhibits expectation-based loss aversion as defined in Kőszegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007). The agent’s utility has two additively separable components:
the standard “consumption utility” and the reference-dependent “gain-loss util-
ity”. The agent’s consumption utility, denoted by u(·), is assumed to be strictly
increasing, (weakly) concave, and unbounded, i.e., u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) ≤ 0. The
second component comes from reference-dependent preferences: the agent com-
pares a realized outcome to a stochastic reference point, and how his overall utility
is affected depends on whether this comparison is perceived as a gain or a loss.
The gain-loss function µ(·) satisfies the assumptions on the “value function” by






m for m ≥ 0
λm for m < 0
where λ ≥ 1 represents the degree of loss aversion.
To determine the reference point, I apply the concept of choice-acclimating
personal equilibrium (CPE) in the sense of Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), which
makes two important assumptions. First, the agent forms the reference point, to
which realized outcomes are evaluated, after making the decision, and thus his
decision affects his reference point. As mentioned by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007),
CPE considers outcomes that are resolved long after all decisions are made. Thus,
the reference point is endogenously determined as the agent’s rational expectation
about the outcomes given his decision. Second, the reference point is stochastic
if the decision’s outcome is stochastic. To form a stochastic reference point, it is
assumed that the agent knows the set of possible outcomes and its probability
utility is positive.
LOSS AVERSION, MORAL HAZARD, AND STOCHASTIC CONTRACTS 9
distribution conditional on his decisions. These two assumptions give rise to a
crucial feature of CPE: a stochastic outcome is evaluated to a stochastic reference
point by comparing outcome by outcome, where each comparison is weighted with
the joint probability with which a certain outcome is realized and an alternative
outcome is expected.
On the other hand, the principal is assumed to be risk and loss neutral. I
assume that the agent’s “work” generates sufficient profit to the principal that she
strictly prefers to implement the high action aH . Thus I focus on the principal’s
cost minimization problem, and inquire into the optimal contract design under
moral hazard with loss aversion.
In designing the optimal contract, the principal can distort the outcome distri-
bution by adding noise to the performance signals. Put differently, she can fully
employ stochastic contracts to implement the desired action. A stochastic con-
tract specifies wage payments contingent not only on the contractible signals but
also on a stochastic device that does not depend on the agent’s action. Formally,
the principal offers the agent a state-contingent stochastic contract (Cs)s∈S , in
which each Cs entails a stochastic device — uncorrelated with the agent’s action
— that specifies wage payments within the contract.
In the setting of two signals, the principal offers a stochastic contract (C1, C2).
If the principal observes the good signal s = 2, then the agent receives C2 that
specifies a lottery (p2, 1 − p2) over wage payments.
3 Analogously, C1 with a
lottery (p1, 1−p1) is realized if the bad signal s = 1 is observed. Importantly, the
principal has full control over the design of these lotteries (p1, p2) that I refer to
as the “stochastic structure”.
As shown in Figure 1, the distribution over the outcomes i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} depends
on both the agent’s action and the principal’s choice of stochastic structure. Fig-
ure 1 represents how the distribution over the wage payments (wi)
4
i=1 depends
on the agent’s action a ∈ {aH , aL} under the stochastic contract. By committing
to the stochastic structure (p1, p2) in the contract, the principal makes the wage
distribution common knowledge to the agent before he chooses his action. Thus,
in the process of choosing an action, the agent incorporates the structure of the
stochastic contract and forms a rational expectation about monetary outcomes.
3The assumption that a lottery specifies two outcomes is without loss of generality. Even when the
lottery specifies more than two outcomes, the principal prefers to lump outcomes into two distinct sets.
This is in line with the finding by Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk (2010) that the optimal contract
specifies two levels of wages.
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Note: The left diagram depicts the distribution of wage payments conditional on the agent’s high action
aH . The right diagram depicts the distribution of wage payments conditional on the agent’s low action
aL.
More precisely, consider a particular case in which the agent chooses the high
action aH and that a certain outcome i is realized. The agent receives wi and
incurs effort cost c. Given that wi is realized, he compares the realized outcome wi
to all alternative outcomes. Although wi is realized, with some probability fj(aH)
he expects an alternative outcome j 6= i to be observed. If wi > wj , the agent
experiences a gain of u(wi)− u(wj), whereas if wi < wj , the agent experiences a
loss of λ(u(wi)−u(wj)). If wi = wj , there is no gain or loss involved. The agent’s








Notice that this particular comparison occurs with the probability fi(aH) that
outcome i is realized. When there is uncertainty in the decision’s outcome, the
agent’s expected utility is obtained by averaging over all possible comparisons.
III. The Principal’s Problem
Denote ui = u(wi). With this notation, the agent’s expected utility from choos-









fi(a)fj(a)(ui − uj)− c(a)
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The first term captures the agent’s expected consumption utility. For λ = 1, we
are back in the standard case without loss aversion. The second term captures
the gain-loss utility. While the agent expects a high wage ui to come up with
probability fi(a), with probability fj(a) he receives a low wage uj and experiences
a loss of λ(ui − uj). On the other hand, if the agent expects the low wage with
probability fj(a), with probability fi(a) he receives the high wage and experiences
a gain of ui − uj . Since losses loom larger than gains of equal size (λ ≥ 1), the
gain-loss utility is always negative in expectation. Following Herweg, Müller and
Weinschenk (2010), I refer to this expected net loss as the agent’s “loss premium”.
For an agent with a higher degree of loss aversion, the principal has to pay a higher
loss premium in a given contract.
Let h(·) := u−1(·) be the wage that the principal offers the agent to obtain utility
ui, i.e., h(ui) = wi. Due to the assumptions on u(·), h(·) is strictly increasing and
(weakly) convex. Following Grossman and Hart (1983), I regard u = (u1, . . . , u4)
as the principal’s control variables in her cost minimization problem. The princi-
pal specifies a wage payment wi for each outcome i in the employment contract,
equivalently an utility level ui.
The key assumption is that, besides the wage payments, the principal controls
the stochastic structure p = (p1, p2). In sharp contrast to deterministic contracts,
stochastic contracts allows the principal to manipulate the outcome distribution.
Her problem is thus to minimize the expected wage payment that implements aH




subject to EU(aH) ≥ 0(PC)
EU(aH) ≥ EU(aL)(IC)
In deterministic contracts, it is well-established that if the agent is sufficiently
loss averse, i.e. λ > 2, then the agent might choose the stochastically domi-
nated action, and the principal, facing a severe implementation problem, might
be unable to induce the high action (Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk, 2010). I
now examine if there are incentive-compatible wage payments under stochastic
contracts to implement aH and show that, in sharp contrast to deterministic
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contracts, stochastic contracts do not suffer from the implementation problem.4
LEMMA 1: Suppose u′′(·) ≤ 0 and λ ≥ 1. For every λ, there exists a stochastic
contract such that the action aH can be implemented.
Lemma 1 states that given any degree of loss aversion there are incentive-
compatible wages and a stochastic structure such that the agent accepts the
stochastic contract and chooses the high action. In particular, the principal pays
out a high wage whenever she observes a good signal, while after observing a bad
signal she adds a lottery that gives either the high wage or a low wage. This means,
in the stochastic contract, the principal turns a blind eye on the agent’s receiving a
bad signal and insures the agent against wage uncertainty. The stochastic contract
circumvents the implementation problem of deterministic contracts, because, by
increasing the probability of getting the high wage, the principal simultaneously
reduces the agent’s expected net loss when he works and increases his expected net
loss when he shirks. For a sufficiently loss-averse agent, whose primary concern
is to minimize the expected net loss, the stochastic contract makes working more
attractive than shirking.
So far it is established that the constraint set of the principal’s cost minimization
problem is non-empty for the high action aH given any degree of loss aversion. I
restrict attention to the stochastic contract of the turning-a-blind-eye structure
for the following analysis.5
IV. The Optimal Contract
In this section, I examine the existence and the characteristics of the optimal
contract. First, I focus on the case of a loss-averse but risk-neutral agent. I
will show that under a weak condition there exists a stochastic contract that
strictly dominates deterministic contracts. The principal can lower the cost of
implementing the desired action by employing stochastic contracts rather than
deterministic contracts. Surprisingly, this holds true even when deterministic
contracts do not face the implementation problem. The dominance of stochastic
4All proofs of lemmas and propositions are provided in the Appendix.
5The strategy “turing a blind eye” was first discussed in Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk (2010),
who show that indeed when facing an implementation problem, the principal can still implement the
desired action by stochastically ignoring the agent’s bad performance. In this paper, I focus more on the
situations in which the implementation problem does not prevail and the principal can use deterministic
contracts to induce the agent to work.
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contracts, however, implies that for many cases the second-best optimal stochastic
contract does not exist. With agents being expectation-based loss averse, an
existence problem, which does not prevail in the standard model, arises. Second,
I examine whether limited liability mitigates the non-existence issue of stochastic
contracts and characterize the second-best optimal stochastic contract. Third,
I consider the general case of a risk- and loss-averse agent and show that the
first-best can be approximated closely, but not attained, by stochastic contracts
that provide the bonus almost certainly.
A. Strict Dominance of Stochastic Contracts
Consider an agent who is risk neutral in the standard notion, u′′(·) = 0, but
exhibits loss aversion λ > 1.
If the principal is restricted to offer deterministic contracts, with two possible
signals s ∈ {1, 2}, the deterministic contract takes the form of a bonus contract:
the agent is paid a base wage w if the bad signal is realized, and he is paid the
base wage w plus a bonus b > 0 if the good signal is realized.
Under this deterministic contract, the agent prefers the high action aH over the
low action aL if his utility from the high action exceeds his utility from the low
action. This is the case if and only if
w + qHb− (λ− 1)qH(1− qH)b− c ≥ w + qLb− (λ− 1)qL(1− qL)b
⇔ (qH − qL)b− (λ− 1) [qH(1− qH)− qL(1− qL)] b ≥ c(IC-D)
Because both the participation and incentive constraints are binding, the princi-
pal’s cost minimization problem is equivalent to minimizing the agent’s loss pre-
mium conditional on aH subject to the incentive constraint. I examine whether
there exists a stochastic contract that satisfies the incentive constraint and at the
same time reduces the loss premium that the principal has to pay.
Assuming that the principal can employ stochastic contracts, I consider the
stochastic contract that takes the turning-a-blind-eye structure: the principal
pays a high wage with probability 1 if she observes the good signal, while if she
observes the bad signal she stochastically ignores it by paying the high wage with
probability p1 and paying a low wage with probability 1− p1. It follows directly
from Lemma 1 that the stochastic contract satisfies the incentive constraint and
implements the high action. I examine whether the stochastic contract benefits
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the principal from a cost perspective in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Then, there exists
a stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly
dominates the optimal deterministic contract.
Besides remedying the implementation problem, the stochastic contract benefits
the principal from a cost perspective: the principal pays a lower loss premium to
the agent in the stochastic contract. To see the intuition for Proposition 1, note
first that the agent’s loss premium depends on two variables: (i) the bonus size b
and (ii) the probability with which the agent feels a loss when a deviation from his
reference point occurs qH(1−qH), which following Herweg, Müller andWeinschenk
(2010) I refer to as “loss probabiliy”. The loss probability is an inverted U-shaped
function; it reaches its maximum when getting a bonus is completely random, i.e.
qH = 1/2, and it reaches its minimum of zero as the bonus probability moves to
the extremes, i.e. qH = 0 or qH = 1. By employing the stochastic contract that
pays the low wage only if the worst outcome (i = 1) is realized and pays the high
wage for all other outcomes, the principal increases the bonus probability closer
to one and thereby reduces the associated loss probability closer to zero.
Although the stochastic contract decreases the probability that the agent feels
a loss, it increases the bonus size b required to incentivize the agent to work. As
the probability of getting a bonus increases, the outcome distribution under the
high action resembles that under the low action. Thus, to satisfy the incentive
constraint, the principal needs a higher bonus. Put together, the stochastic con-
tract has two opposing effects on the loss probability and the bonus size. While
the insurance against wage uncertainty may come at the cost of a larger expected
bonus required to induce the agent to work, the positive effect of the reduced loss
probability outweighs the negative effect of the increased bonus size if the agent
is sufficiently loss averse.
Figure 2 illustrates the dominance of the stochastic contract for a simple ex-
ample with qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3, and p1 = 0.75. The dashed line in Figure 2
shows the principal’s implementation cost under the optimal deterministic con-
tract, and the solid line shows the minimum cost under the stochastic contract
with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4. Given qH = 0.8 and qL = 0.3,
the condition λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL in Proposition 1 translates to λ > 1.29. As shown in
Figure 2, for λ ∈ [1, 1.29], the optimal deterministic contract yields a lower cost
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Note: The figure shows an illustration of the principal’s cost under stochastic contracts and deterministic
contracts for qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3, p1 = 0.75, p2 = 1, and c = 1. The dashed line shows the principal’s
implementation cost in the optimal deterministic contract. The solid line shows the the principal’s
minimum cost in the stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
for the principal, while for λ > 1.29, the stochastic contract strictly dominates
the optimal deterministic contract. The higher the degree of loss aversion, the
larger the relative benefit of using the stochastic contract for the principal.
Interestingly, the condition on the degree of loss aversion in Proposition 1 is
much weaker than that previously established in the literature. Herweg, Müller
and Weinschenk (2010) establish that turning a blind eye enables the principal
to achieve a lower cost if and only if λ > 2.6 Notice that in Proposition 1 the
condition 1−qH1−qL + 1 is strictly smaller than 2; this would imply a larger set of
degrees of loss aversion than previously thought under which stochastic contracts
strictly dominate deterministic contracts.
A second interesting observation is that as the performance signals become more
informative about the agent’s action, the principal favors the stochastic contract
under a wider range of the degree of loss aversion. Let us consider two extreme
6In particular, Herweg, Müller andWeinschenk (2010) assume an incomplete contracting environment,
which implies that performance measures are inherently noisy. Thus, this limits the extent to which the
principal can add noise in the optimal contract as compared to the complete contracting setting in my
model.
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cases. If the signals are highly uninformative, i.e. 1−qH1−qL → 1, then the most
restrictive condition under which the stochastic contract dominates deterministic
contracts becomes λ > 2, which coincides with the well-established condition in
the literature. The condition on the degree of loss aversion, however, gets weaker
as the performance signals provide more information about the agent’s action.
At the other extreme, if the signals are highly informative, i.e. 1−qH1−qL → 0, then
the condition becomes λ > 1. This means if the signals provide almost precise
information about the agent’s action, then the principal benefits from using the
stochastic contract almost all the time. The logic is that when the given signals are
very informative, the principal provides further wage certainty at a negligible cost
and prefers to do so to a large extent. Put differently, in the limit the stochastic
contract strictly dominates deterministic contracts for almost any degree of loss
aversion.
B. Non-Existence of The Second-Best Optimal Contract
In this part, I focus on the cases where stochastic contracts strictly domi-
nate deterministic contracts, and attempt to characterize the second-best optimal
stochastic contract, assuming for now that the solution exists. Formally, I assume
that u′′(·) = 0 and λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL .
Similar to the finding by Herweg, Müller and Weinschenk (2010), a first impor-
tant observation is that the optimal stochastic contract should take the form of
a bonus contract. When an agent is risk neutral but loss averse, it is optimal for
the principal to pool as many informative signals as possible into a bonus set and
pay a high wage only if the realized signal lies in this bonus set. The logic is that
when facing the risk-neutral agent, the principal cannot capitalize on a higher
degree of wage differentiation. On the other hand, pooling wages together helps
the loss-averse agent avoid unfavourable comparisons and yields him a higher ex-
pected utility. To satisfy the incentive constraint, the optimal contract requires
a minimum degree of wage differentiation in that the principal offers two wage
levels – a base wage and a bonus – no matter how rich the signal space is.
It remains to determine which outcomes i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} should be included in
the bonus set. Given any contract (ŵi)
4
i=1 that the principal offers, I can relabel
the outcomes i such that this contract is equivalent to a contract (wi)
4
i=1 of
an (weakly) increasing wage profile with wi−1 ≤ wi for all i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Thus
the bonus set can be one of the three options: (i) the bonus set includes only
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the highest outcome {w4}, or (ii) the bonus set includes two highest outcomes
{w4, w3}, or (iii) the bonus set includes all but the lowest outcome {w4, w3, w2}.
I examine the option (i) in the following lemma.
LEMMA 2: Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ > 1. Then, any stochastic contract with
the wage structure w1 = w2 = w3 < w4 is weakly dominated by the optimal
deterministic contract.
A stochastic contract that rewards only the highest outcome reduces the prob-
ability of getting a bonus; a slim chance of getting a bonus in turn simultaneously
increases the agent’s expected net loss when he works and decreases his expected
net loss when he shirks. Because the agent cares sufficiently about minimizing
the expected loss, this implies that the stochastic contract of the wage structure
w1 = w2 = w3 < w4 worsens the implementation problem under loss aversion.
Moreover, the principal requires a substantially higher bonus to motivate the
agent to work. Due to the worsened implementation problem, the negative effects
of an increased bonus outweighs the positive effects of a reduced loss probability,
leading to that the principal’s implementation cost actually increases with such
a stochastic contract.
Note that the option (ii) coincides with the deterministic contract. As in Propo-
sition 1, the optimal deterministic contract is strictly dominated by the stochastic
contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4. Taken these two obser-
vations together, it is thus optimal to include all but the worst outcome in the
bonus set.
With the bonus set including all except for the worst outcome i = 1, I derive
the principal’s implementation cost for a given stochastic structure. The compar-
ative statics of the principal’s implementation cost with respect to the probability
of getting a bonus p1 reveals an insight about the existence of the second-best
optimal stochastic contract, which is covered in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Then, the second-best
optimal stochastic contract does not exist.
The solution to the principal’s problem with the above stochastic contract is
not well-defined. The reason is that the principal can always achieve a lower
cost by further increasing the probability of getting a bonus p1 close to one and
rendering the penalty harsher in the event of the bad signal. However, p1 cannot
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Figure 3. : Principal’s cost as a function of the bonus probability



















Note: The figure shows an illustration of the principal’s cost under the stochastic contract of the wage
structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 for qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3, p2 = 1, and c = 1.
reach the value of one, as the contract then becomes a fixed wage contract that
does not satisfy the incentive constraint. In the limit, the principal’s cost Cr in









Figure 3 illustrates how the principal’s implementation cost changes with re-
spect to the probability of getting a bonus p1 for a simple example with qH = 0.8
and qL = 0.3. The solid, dashed, and dotted lines correspond to the principal’s
cost for λ = 1.5, λ = 2, and λ = 2.5 respectively. All the lines exhibit a downward
trend, implying that the principal’s cost decreases as p1 increases. However, there
is a discontinuity, depicted as empty circles, at p1 = 1. If p1 = 1, the principal
cannot induce the agent to work, her implementation cost becomes prohibitively
high.
C. Limited Liability
The non-existence of the second-best optimal stochastic contract hinges on
the principal’s desire to insure the agent against wage uncertainty to the largest
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possible extent, and thereby to further reduce her cost, if the agent is sufficiently
loss averse. On the other hand, to motivate the agent to work in the face of such
insurance, the principal punishes the agent indefinitely when the worst outcome
is realized. If the punishment for the worst outcome is, however, limited, the
principal faces an upper bound of how much wage certainty she can provide to
the agent. In this part, I show that the second-best optimal stochastic contract
exists if the principal faces a limited liability constraint, and characterize the
second-best optimal contract.
Analogous to the previous analysis, it can be shown that the optimal bonus set
consists of all but the worst outcome. I thus restrict my attention to stochastic
contracts of the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4. Let fH and fL be the
probability of getting a bonus conditional on the agent’s high and low action
respectively, i.e., fH = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and fL = P [i > 1|aL] =





w + fHb− (λ− 1)bfH(1− fH) ≥ c(PC)
b(fH − fL)− (λ− 1)b[fH(1− fH)− fL(1− fL)] ≥ c(IC)
w ≥ 0(LL)
Because the (IC) binds at optimum (else, the principal can reduce b by a small
amount), the optimal bonus size can be written as a function of p1:
b∗(p1) =
c
(qH − qL)(1− p1)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
The (LL) constraint is also binding at optimum. Else, by reducing w by a small
amount, the principal decreases the expected payment without changing (IC) or
violating (LL). Thus, the principal’s cost in the stochastic contract is given by
Cr(p1) = fHb
∗. Note that at p1 = 0, the stochastic contract coincides with the
deterministic contract such that the principal’s minimum cost remains unchanged.
The principal reduces her implementation cost by using the stochastic contract if
the following assumption holds.
ASSUMPTION 1 (A1): (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL + qH(2− qH − qL)) > 1
20 MARCH 2021
Figure 4. : Principal’s cost under limited liability




















Note: The figure shows an illustration of the principal’s cost under stochastic contracts and deterministic
contracts under limited liability for qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3, p2 = 1, c = 1 and λ = 3. The dashed line shows
the principal’s implementation cost in the optimal deterministic contract. The solid line shows the the
principal’s minimum cost in the stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
Assumption (A1) is a sufficient and necessary condition for the principal’s min-
imum cost function to be locally decreasing at p1 = 0. Given (A1), there exists
a stochastic contract that strictly dominates the optimal deterministic contract
under limited liability. Solving for the optimal p∗1 that minimizes Cr(p1), I char-
acterize the second-best optimal stochastic contract in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose (A1) holds, u′′(·) = 0, and w ≥ 0. Then, the
second-best optimal stochastic contract exists. The optimal stochastic contract
pays b∗(p∗1) with probability one when the good signal is realized and with proba-
bility p∗1 when the bad signal is realized. The optimal p
∗











2− qH − qL
− qH
)
Figure 4 illustrates the second-best optimal stochastic contract under limited
liability with a simple example of qH = 0.8, qL = 0.3 and λ = 3. With this
parameter specification, the principal can implement the desired action with a
deterministic contract that reaches the lowest cost of C∗d = 1.33. The Assumption
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(A1), translating to λ > 2.61, is satisfied under the specification of λ = 3. The
second-best optimal stochastic contract pays b∗(p∗1) = 1.62 with probability one
if the principal observes the good signal s = 2 and with probability p∗1 = 0.08 if
she observes the bad signal s = 1. Thus, the principal yields the optimal cost of
C∗r = 1.32, which is strictly lower than C
∗
d .
If the agent is subject to limited liability, the solution of the principal’s problem
is well-defined. Intuitively, limited liability limits the extent to which the principal
can punish the agent in the event of bad outcomes, and in turn her ability to insure
the agent against wage uncertainty. Put differently, the principal does not benefit
from increasing the bonus probability p1 close to 1 under the limited liability
constraint. As the base wage w is bounded by zero, in order to motivate the
agent to work, the bonus b becomes substantially large after a certain level of
wage certainty.
D. First Best Approximation
Loss aversion imposes an extra cost for the principal: the principal has to
pay the loss premium to the agent for him to accept the contract and choose
to work. So far I show that stochastic contracts help the principal reduce her
implementation cost as compared to deterministic contracts if the agent is risk
neutral but loss averse. In this section, I examine whether stochastic contracts
reduce the principal’s cost in a general case, i.e., the agent is both risk- and
loss-averse.
In particular, I assume that the agent is both risk averse, u′′(·) < 0, and loss
averse, λ ≥ 1. Suppose that there exists a penalty wage (w = 0) at which
the agent feels a substantial disutility, i.e., limu(w) = −∞ as w → 0. This
assumption is standard in the contract theory literature (Mirrlees, 1999), which
can be interpreted as, for example, a firing decision. If the agent gets fired and
receives a wage close to zero, he feels a substantial disutility. The following
proposition characterizes the principal’s cost for the general case.
PROPOSITION 4: Assume u′′(·) < 0 and λ ≥ 1. Suppose lim
w→0
u(w) = −∞,
then the first-best can be approximated arbitrarily closely, but not attained, by
stochastic contracts that provide a bonus almost certainly.
To understand Proposition 4, recall the intuition from Proposition 2: stochas-
tic contracts reduce the principal’s cost by providing the wage certainty to the
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loss-averse agent, but this certainty comes at the cost of a larger bonus required
to induce the high action. Put differently, the dominance of stochastic contracts
depends on how effectively the principal can punish the agent if the worst out-
come is realized. If the principal can employ a penalty wage to punish the agent
effectively—for example, firing decisions in dismissal contracts—she can create a
strong marginal work incentive with an arbitrarily small effect on her cost. This,
in turn, allows the principal to insure the agent with the wage certainty to the
largest possible extent. Yet in the light of Proposition 2 the first best can only be
approximated closely, but not attained, because the second-best optimal stochas-
tic contract does not exist. In the limit, as the bonus probability p1 → 1, the
efficiency loss associated with moral hazard and loss aversion becomes negligible.
E. Alternative Notions of Loss Aversion
The notion of loss aversion crucially depends on how the reference point is con-
ceptualized. In my model the reference point has two important features. First,
it allows for stochastic reference points; the agent compares a realized outcome
with all possible outcomes. This pairwise comparison implies a possibility of
“mixed feeling”, i.e., the same realized outcome can be perceived as both a gain
and a loss at the same time, depending on which possible outcomes the agent ex-
pects. Second, the reference point is formed after the decision is made, and hence
is influenced by the chosen decision. Thus, the reference point is endogenously
determined by recent expectations.
A related notion to the CPE concept is the forward-looking disappointment
aversion according to Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), or Gul (1991).
Under the disappointment aversion model, the reference point is also formed after
the decision is made, but the reference point takes the form of certainty equivalent
of the prospect, and hence it admits only static reference points. The certainty
equivalent of the prospect is a point estimate and does not allow for mixed feelings;
the agent feels a gain if the realized outcome is above it, and vice versa. As
it turns out, even in this case, stochastic contracts help the principal reduce
the implementation cost beyond what is achieved under deterministic contracts.
Again, stochastic contracts add noise after the worst outcome to insure the agent
that he is more likely to receive the high wage.7
7De Meza and Webb (2007) examine the concept of Gul (1991), which is closely related to Bell
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PROPOSITION 5: Suppose the agent exhibits disappointment aversion accord-
ing to Bell (1985), u′′(·) = 0, and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Consider two actions and
two signals. Then, there exists a stochastic contract with the wage structure
w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the optimal deterministic contract.
The forward-looking disappointment according to Bell (1985) implies that the
agent first calculates an expected outcome, and then compares the realized out-
come with his expectation. Under a deterministic contract, if a bonus is realized,
the agent feels elated as the realized outcome is higher than the expected one.
While, if a bonus is not realized, the agent instead feels disappointed as the real-
ized outcome is lower than the expected one. By increasing the bonus probability
in the stochastic contract, the principal simultaneously increases the probability
that the agent feels elated and reduces the probability that he feels disappointed.
Because the agent prioritizes minimizing the feeling of disappointment, if he is
sufficiently disappointment averse, the principal can capitalize on the stochastic
contract to reduce her implementation cost.
An alternative specification of the reference point is that it is given exogenously
and does not internalize the effect of the decision, namely the preferred personal
equilibrium (PPE) notion. In PPE, the agent can choose his optimal action only
from the actions he knows he will follow through, whereas in CPE he can commit
to the action. The analysis of the optimal contract is very similar and gives rise
to the similar result. However, it is known that the distaste for the risk is stronger
when the decision is made up front, as in CPE, than when the decision is made
later, as in PPE. The principal benefits from stochastic contracts that insure the
agent with wage certainty to a lesser extent.
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose the agent exhibits the PPE loss aversion, u′′(·) = 0,
qH + 2qL ≤ 2, and λ − 1 >
1−qH
1−qL
. Consider two actions and two signals. Then,
there exists a stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that
strictly dominates the optimal deterministic contract.
The robustness of the dominance of stochastic contracts suggests that noise
should be generally added to performance measures in the optimal contract for
loss averse agents. Put differently, loss aversion implies a first-order aversion
(1985), and finds that the optimal contracts have intermediate intervals in which wages are insensitive
to performance.
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to wage uncertainty, and this creates incentives for the principal to insure the
agent against this uncertainty. By employing stochastic contracts, the principal
manipulates the outcome distribution to her favor and provides the agent a higher
wage certainty. When loss aversion plays a role, the principal capitalizes on this
reduction in uncertainty and achieves a lower cost.
V. Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal contract design under moral hazard and loss
aversion, and finds that the optimal contract adds noise in the event of bad
outcomes to insure the loss-averse agent against wage uncertainty. To reach this
finding, I modify the standard moral hazard model with two departures: the agent
is expectation-based loss averse, and the principal can add noise in the contract
to manipulate the outcome distribution in her favor. Importantly, the principal
fully controls where to add noise and how to structure noise in the contract, i.e.,
the structure of stochastic contracts.
There are three key takeaways from this paper. First, the principal is strictly
better off with stochastic contracts, as compared to deterministic contracts, in
implementing the desired action if the agent is loss averse. This result relates to
the literature on behavioral contract theory, which has pointed out that if deter-
ministic contracts face an implementation problem, turning a blind eye (Herweg,
Müller and Weinschenk, 2010) or team incentives (Daido and Murooka, 2016) help
the principal induce the agent to work. Contributing to this literature strand, I
find that even if deterministic contracts do not face the implementation problem,
the principal can still reduce her cost by employing stochastic contracts. In fact,
if the signals are highly informative about the agent’s action, stochastic contracts
strictly dominate deterministic contracts for almost any degree of loss aversion.
Thus, this finding has an important implication for designing contracts for loss-
averse agents: the principal has an incentive to add noise after the bad signal is
realized to insure the agent against wage uncertainty.
Second, limited liability mitigates the non-existence problem of the second-best
optimal stochastic contract. Instead of the implementation problem, stochastic
contracts face a non-existence problem that the optimal contract does not exist,
because the principal has an incentive to insure the agent to the largest possible
extent. Given a wide range of loss aversion over which stochastic contracts dom-
inates deterministic contracts, the non-existence problem proves to be severe. To
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solve the non-existence problem, I find that limited liability helps restore the exis-
tence of the second-best optimal contract. This finding highlights the importance
of limited liability in stochastic contracts to ensure that the second-best optimal
contract exists.
Third, in a general case when the agent is both loss and risk averse, the prin-
cipal can closely approximate the first best scenario by employing a stochastic
contract that provides a bonus almost certainly but punishes the agent sternly
in the event of the worst outcome—mimicking dismissal contracts. From the
standard perspective that risk aversion increases the cost of stochastic contracts,
this finding is theoretically interesting: stochastic contracts that insure the agent
against wage uncertainty help the principal reduce both risk premium and loss
premium that she has to pay. This finding also provides an explanation for why
fixed wage contracts with firing threats remain the most commonly used contract
in practice.
Given that loss aversion is an important and well-established behavioural trait,
this paper helps explain the relevance of stochastic contracts (e.g., dismissal con-
tracts) in the real world. Going forward, it would be interesting to examine
the interaction of loss aversion with other behavioural or cognitive biases, such
as overconfidence, that may induce the agent to have an incorrect model of the
world. The interaction of these biases and their implications on the optimal
contract design is an exciting research topic.
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Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
Suppose u′′(·) ≤ 0 and λ ≥ 1. For every λ, there exists a stochastic contract
such that the action aH can be implemented.






u+ b for i > 1
u for i = 1
where b > 0.
Let fH1 and f
L
1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on the agent’s
high and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and
fL1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1 − qL). Under this contractual form, (IC) is given
by
(IC) b(fH1 − f
L








1 )] = c
which can be rewritten as
(IC’) b{(fH1 − f
L




1 )]} = c
Under this stochastic contract, fH1 = qH + p1(1− qH) and f
L
1 = qL + p1(1− qL).
It is straight-forward to see that fH1 > f
L
1 as qH > qL and p1 < 1.
Consider
1− fH1 − f
L
1 = 1− (qH + p1(1− qH))− (qL + p1(1− qL))
= 1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL)
Notice for p1 ≥ 1/2, this above term is strictly negative. This implies the term
in curly brackets in (IC’) is strictly positive for 1 > p1 ≥ 1/2. Hence, with c > 0,
b can always be chosen such that (IC) is met.
The binding participation constraint can be written as follows




1 ) = c
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(PC) is satisfied whenever u is chosen as above.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Then, there exists a stochastic contract
with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the optimal
deterministic contract.






w + b for i > 1
w for i = 1
where b > 0. The non-emptiness of the constraint set follows from Lemma 1.
Let fH1 and f
L
1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on the agent’s
high and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and
fL1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
Consider any p1 ∈ [
1
2 , 1). The principal’s problem becomes
min
w,b
w + fH1 b
subject to




1 ) = c(PC)
b(fH1 − f
L








1 )] = c(IC)










Recall that fH1 = qH +p1(1− qH) and f
L
1 = qL+p1(1− qL). Under the stochastic




1 )b, is given
by
Cr = c+
(λ− 1)[qH + p1(1− qH)](1− qH)(1− p1)c
(qH − qL)(1− p1)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
32 MARCH 2021
Suppose that the optimal deterministic contract exists.8 Then the principal’s cost
under the optimal deterministic contract (i.e., p1 = 0) is given by
Cd = c+
(λ− 1)qH(1− qH)c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
The stochastic contract reduces the principal’s cost if and only if Cd ≥ Cr.
⇔
qH
1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)
≥
qH + p1(1− qH)
1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))
Since the solution exists for both deterministic and stochastic contracts, both
denominators are positive. Cross multiply the inequalities.
Notice the term qH [1−(λ−1)(1−qH−qL)] is present on both sides. The inequality
is reduced to
⇔ qH(λ− 1)p1(2− qH − qL) ≥ p1(1− qH)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
⇔ qH(λ− 1)(2− qH − qL) ≥ (1− qH)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
Removing the term qH(λ− 1)(1− qH − qL) on both sides, I have
⇔ qH(λ− 1) ≥ 1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)− qH
⇔ 0 ≥ 1− qH − (λ− 1)(1− qL)
⇔ λ− 1 ≥
1− qH
1− qL
Since λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL , Cr < Cd . This completes the proof.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ ≥ 1. Then, any stochastic contract with the wage
structure w1 = w2 = w3 < w4 is weakly dominated by the optimal deterministic
contract.
8If the principal’s constraint set is empty under deterministic contracts, then it is assumed that the
principal’s cost becomes prohibitively high. It follows directly that stochastic contracts, which enable
the principal to implement the desired action, strictly dominate deterministic contracts.
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w + b for i = 4
w for i < 4
where b > 0. Let fH4 and f
L
4 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional on
the agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH4 = P [i = 4|aH ] = p2qH and
fL4 = P [i = 4|aL] = p2qL.
The principal’s problem becomes
min
w,b
w + fH4 b
subject to




4 ) = c(PC)
b(fH4 − f
L








4 )] = c(IC)











Recall that fH4 = p2qH and f
L
4 = p2qL. Under the stochastic contract of this
form, the principal’s cost, C = c+ (λ− 1)fH4 (1− f
H
4 )b, is given by
C = c+
(λ− 1)p2qH(1− p2qH)c
p2(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− p2qH − p2qL)]
Note that if the constraint set for the above stochastic contract is non-empty,
then the constraint set for the deterministic contract is also non-empty. Thus,




(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
It is straight-forward to see that C ≥ Cd for any 1 ≥ p2 > 0.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Suppose u′′(·) = 0 and λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Then, the second-best optimal stochastic
contract does not exist.
Suppose, by contradiction, the solution for the principal’s problem exists.
I decompose the principal’s problem into two subproblems. First, for a given
stochastic structure (p1, p2), I derive the optimal wage payments that implement
aH . Second, I choose the stochastic structure to achieve the lowest cost.
Step 1: Given any contract (ŵi)
4
i=1 the principal offers, I can relabel the states
such that this contract is equivalent to a contract (wi)
4
i=1 of an (weakly) increasing
wage profile with wi−1 ≤ wi for all i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Let bi = wi − wi−1 ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Let fHi and f
L
i be the probability that state i is realized conditional
on aH and aL respectively.



















































The principal’s problem is a linear programming problem. It is well known that
if a linear programming has a solution, this (unique) solution is an extreme point
of the constraint set. All extreme points of the constraint set are characterised
by the following property: bi > 0 for exactly one state i ∈ {2, 3, 4} and bt = 0 for
all t 6= i, t ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
It remains to determine for which state i ∈ {2, 3, 4} the bonus is set strictly
positive. From Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 if λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL , the second-best
optimal stochastic contract has the optimal wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
Step 2: I now consider the optimal stochastic structure p1 to achieve the
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lowest cost. Recall that under the stochastic contract with the wage structure
w1 < w2 = w3 = w4, the principal’s cost is given by
Cr = c+
(λ− 1)[qH + p1(1− qH)][1− qH ]c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]




c(λ− 1)(1− qH)[2− qH − qL − λ(1− qL)]
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]2
Obviously, ∂Cr/∂p1 < 0 for all p1 as λ >
2−qH−qL
1−qL
. The principal can always
achieve a lower cost by increasing p1 close to 1, i.e., the probability of bonus is
almost 1. However, p1 can not reach 1 due to the incentive constraint. Hence,
the second-best optimal stochastic contract does not exist.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Suppose (A1) holds, u′′(·) = 0, and w ≥ 0. Then, the second-best optimal
stochastic contract exists. The optimal stochastic contract pays b∗(p∗1) with prob-
ability one when the good signal is realized and with probability p∗1 when the bad











2− qH − qL
− qH
)





w + b for i > 1
w for i = 1
where b > 0. Let fH1 and f
L
1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional
on the agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH +
p1(1− qH) and f
L
1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
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The principal’s problem becomes
min
w,b
w + fH1 b
subject to




1 ) ≥ c(PC)
b(fH1 − f
L








1 )] ≥ c(IC)
w ≥ 0(LL)
Notice first that the (LL) constraint is binding. Suppose, by contradiction, w > 0
is the optimal wage scheme. Reducing w by a small amount ǫ, the principal de-
creases the expected payment without changing (IC) or violating (LL) constraint.
Thus, w∗ = 0.
Notice also that the (IC) constraint is binding. Suppose, by contradiction, (IC)
is slack. Reducing b by a small amount ǫ, the principal decreases the expected
payment without changing (LL) or violating (IC) constraint.
Assume that the optimal deterministic contract exists, then the constraint set















∗, is given by
Cr =
(qH + p1(1− qH))c
(qH − qL)(1− p1)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
Analogously, the principal’s cost under the optimal deterministic contract with
limited liability is given by
Cd =
qHc
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
Note that if p1 = 0, then Cr = Cd
9If the deterministic contract has no solution, the dominance of the stochastic contract is trivial. The
reason is that the principal can always implement aH under the stochastic contract by setting p1 ∈ [1/2, 1)
(Lemma 1). On the other hand, if the optimal deterministic contract exists, i.e., (λ−1)(1−qH −qL) < 1,
it follows that (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL)) < 1. Thus, the constraint set under the stochastic
contract is non-empty for all p1.
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< 0 ⇔ (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL + qH(2− qH − qL)) > 1
Provided that (A1) holds, there exists a stochastic contract of the wage structure
w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly dominates the optimal deterministic contract.
10











2− qH − qL
− qH
)
The second-best optimal stochastic contract is characterized by w∗ = 0, b∗(p∗1),
and p∗1. This completes the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Assume u′′(·) < 0 and λ > 1. Suppose lim
w→0
u(w) = −∞, then the first-best can
be approximated arbitrarily closely, but not attained, by stochastic contracts that
provide a bonus almost certainly.





wH for i > 1
δwH for i = 1
where δ ∈ (0, 1) remains to be chosen.
I define wH such that u(wH) = u(wFB) + ǫ , for ǫ > 0. Thus, u(wH) = c + ǫ,
equivalently wH = h(c + ǫ). Let f
H
1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH + p1(1 − qH) and
fL1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
10Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2, it can be shown that under limited liability, adding noise
to the good outcome is weakly dominated by the optimal deterministic contract. The cost of a
stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 = w2 = w3 < w4 under limited liability is given by
C = qHc
(qH−qL)(1−(λ−1)(1−p2qH−p2qL)
, which is weakly larger than Cd – the cost under the optimal de-
terministic contract – for all p2 ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the second-best optimal stochastic contract has the wage
structure of w1 < w2 = w3 = w4.
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I will show that this above stochastic contract satisfies both the participation
and incentive constraint. First, I check that the incentive constraint (IC) holds
under wi. To see this, note that for δ = 1, this incentive scheme becomes a
fixed wage. Thus, for δ = 1, the left-hand side of (IC) equals to zero, and the
incentive constraint (IC) in consequence is not satisfied. As δ → 0, by assumption
lim
w→0
u(w) = −∞, the left-hand side of (IC) tending to infinity. Since the left-hand
side of (IC) is continuous in δ under the wage scheme wi, by intermediate-value
theorem, there exists a (unique) δ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that (IC) is satisfied with equality.
Next, consider (PC). The left-hand side of (PC) under the wage scheme wi with
δ = δ̂ amounts to
(PC) u(wH)[f
H
1 − (λ− 1)ρ
H
1 ] + u(δ̂wH)[1− f
H
1 + (λ− 1)ρ
H
1 ] ≥ c





Note that there exists a stochastic structure p1 such that (f
H
1 − (λ− 1)ρ
H
1 ) > 0.
I restrict the attention to this set of stochastic structure. Since u(·) is strictly
increasing, the left-hand side of (PC) is strictly increasing in ǫ. Note that when
ǫ = 0, (PC) is not satisfied. Since u(·) is an unbounded and continuous function,
there exists ǫ̂ > 0 such that (PC) is satisfied with equality.
Now consider the principal’s cost of providing incentive. The principal’s second-
best cost is given as follows
CSB(aH) = f
H
1 h(c+ ǫ̂) + (1− f
H
1 )(δ̂h(c+ ǫ̂))




1 (1 − f
H
1 ). As p1 → 1,
we have fH1 → 1. From the binding (PC), this implies that ǫ̂ → 0. Hence,
lim
p1→1
CSB(aH) = h(c) = CFB(aH).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
Suppose the agent exhibits disappointment aversion according to Bell (1985),
u′′(·) = 0, and λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Consider two actions and two signals. Then, there
exists a stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that
strictly dominates the optimal deterministic contract.
The proof of Proposition 4 closely follows the proof of Proposition 1. I first
show that the principal’s problem remains the same regardless of whether the
agent exhibits disappointment aversion (Bell, 1985) or loss aversion (Kőszegi and
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Rabin, 2006, 2007).





w + b for i > 1
w for i = 1
where b > 0. Let fH1 and f
L
1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional
on the agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH +
p1(1− qH) and f
L
1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
Under the disappointment aversion, the agent compares a realized outcome to
the certainty equivalence of the prospect, which is given by CEr(aH) = w+ f
H
1 b.
With probability fH1 a bonus is realized, the agent feels elated by receiving (1−
fH1 )b more than the certainty equivalence. With probability (1− f
H
1 ) a bonus is
not realized, the agent feels disappointed by receiving fH1 b less than the certainty
equivalence. The agent’s utility from choosing aH is given by








1 b = w + f
H





The (IC) constraint is given by
b(fH1 − f
L








1 )] = c
Notice that the above (PC) and (IC) constraints coincide with the principal’s
constraints under CPE loss aversion.
Assume w.l.o.g. 1 > p1 ≥ 1/2, the non-emptiness of the constraint set follows
from Lemma 1, and the dominance of the stochastic contract analogously follows
from Proposition 1.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Suppose the agent exhibits the PPE loss aversion, u′′(·) = 0, qH + 2qL ≤ 2
and λ − 1 > 1−qH1−qL . Consider two actions and two signals. Then, there exists
a stochastic contract with the wage structure w1 < w2 = w3 = w4 that strictly
dominates the optimal deterministic contract.





w + b for i > 1
w for i = 1
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where b > 0. Let fH1 and f
L
1 be the probability of getting a bonus conditional
on the agent’s high and low action respectively, i.e., fH1 = P [i > 1|aH ] = qH +
p1(1− qH) and f
L
1 = P [i > 1|aL] = qL + p1(1− qL).
Under PPE loss aversion, the agent identifies (i) the set of personal equilibrium
(PE) that includes all actions the agent can follow through, and (ii) the preferred
action among the set of personal equilibrium (PPE).
a ∈ PE ⇔ EU(a|a) ≥ EU(a′|a) ∀a′ 6= a
a ∈ PPE ⇔ EU(a|a) ≥ EU(a′|a′) ∀a′ ∈ PE
For aH ∈ PE, EU(aH |aH) ≥ EU(aL|aH), the latter refers to the expected
utility when the agent expects to choose aH but actually chooses aL, is given by















This is equivalent to

















Note that b > b for all λ ≥ 1.
The principal’s problem becomes
min
w,b
w + fH1 b
subject to















b ≥ b(aH -PE)
Assume that the optimal deterministic contract exists, it follows that the prin-
cipal’s constraint set for the stochastic contract is non-empty. There exists
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p1 ∈ [0, 1) such that b̃ ≥ b. Consider a relaxed problem without (aH -PE) con-
straint. The relaxed problem coincides with the principal’s problem of CPE loss
aversion and, from Proposition 1, the cost is given by
Cr = c+
(λ− 1)[qH + p1(1− qH)][1− qH ]c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL − p1(2− qH − qL))]
Following the above analysis analogously, if qH + 2qL ≤ 2, then the principal’s
cost under the optimal deterministic contract is given by
Cd = c+
(λ− 1)qH(1− qH)c
(qH − qL)[1− (λ− 1)(1− qH − qL)]
Since λ− 1 > 1−qH1−qL , Cr < Cd. This completes the proof.
